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Abstract
One major function of social networks (e.g., massive online
social networks) is the dissemination of information such as
scientific knowledge, news, and rumors. Information can
be propagated by the users of the network via natural con-
nections in written, oral or electronic form. The information
passing from a sender to a receiver intrinsically involves both
of them considering their self-perceived knowledge, reputa-
tion, and popularity, which further determine their decisions
of whether or not to forward the information and whether
or not to provide feedback. To understand such human as-
pects of the information dissemination, we propose a game
theoretical model of the two-way full duplex information for-
warding and feedback mechanisms in a social network that
take into account the personalities of the communicating ac-
tors (including their perceived knowledgeability, reputation,
and desire for popularity) and the global characteristics of
the network. The model demonstrates how the emergence
of social networks can be explained in terms of maximizing
game theoretical utility.
1 INTRODUCTION
A social network is an ensemble of communicating personal-
ities based on the concept of social proximity. The members
of a social network can form communities [9], influence other
members [2], and engage in other social activities. One ma-
jor function of social networks (in particular, massive online
social networks) is the dissemination of information such
as scientific knowledge, news, and rumors [6, 7, 10, 12].
As an important form of social organization, information
can shape public opinion, inform and misinform the society,
cause panic in a society, promote products, etc. [7]. Infor-
mation can be propagated by the members of the network
via natural connections in written, oral or electronic form.
Due to its importance, information dissemination or dif-
fusion has been one of the focuses in social network research.
For example, theories of rumor spreading are proposed in
[7, 12] to study the information dissemination. Game the-
oretical approach to information propagation (namely, to
learning) has been suggested by Gale et al., Acemoglu et
al. [1, 4]. Ellwardt and van Duijn explored gossiping in small
(organizational) social networks [3]. Since information dis-
semination (and other various social network activities) are
supported by the structural organization of social networks,
social network topology receives a lot of research attention.
For example, an effect of network topology on the informa-
tion diffusion was observed in [5]: sparse networks are more
effective for information entrance, and clustered (cellular)
network structure decreases information diffusion.
In this paper, we propose a game theoretical model
for the information passing between two members of a so-
cial network. The novelty of our model is that psycho-
logical characteristics are explicitly modeled in information
dissemination. In our model, information passing intrin-
sically involves both parties considering their psycholog-
ical characteristics: self-perceived knowledge, reputation,
and popularity—which further determine their decisions of
whether or not to forward the information and whether or
not to provide feedback. The decisions are also based on the
global properties of the network, such as the overall quality
of information and the way unreliable rumors are treated by
the network members.
Feedback in information dissemination is explicitly con-
sidered as strategic moves in our game theoretical model.
Related to our work, Lampe et al. also analyzed the mech-
anism of feedback, its influence on the members of online
communities, and its role in learning transfer [6]. Similar
concept of social influence, but in the context of community
building, has been researched by Crandall et al. [2].
This paper is an extension of the results described in
[13]. In the original paper, we presented an analysis of a
one-directional atomic communication, where one actor is a
speaker (he sends a message) and the other is a listener (and
optionally a commenter—he receives the message and sends
a reply), and the comment, if any, is indivisible from the
original message. However, in real life people can engage
in a concurrent conversation: e.g., Alice may post a note
on Bob’s Facebook wall, and Bob may post a note on Al-
ice’s wall at the same time, without knowing yet about her
post. This interaction cannot be represented as a sequence
of atomic one-way interactions. The current version of our
model allows two actors to communicate in a full duplex
mode, when either or both actors are speaking, listening,
and commenting at the same time.
The model that we developed can be used to explain
communication patterns in massive online social networks
(MOSN) and even the formation of a MOSN based on the
principle of the highest utility.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing paper takes a
similar approach.
2 INFORMATION DISSEMINATION MODEL
In this section, we present our model for characterizing ac-
tors and for the information dissemination between two ac-
tors. Each actor has a utility function which is a combi-
nation of her knowledge, reputation, and popularity. The
information passing between a pair of actors involves learn-
ing, feedback, and utility updating of both participants. We
propose a game theoretic model to study the strategic ac-
tions of actors in Section 3 and then further look at the
information dissemination in a network setting involving a
large number of actors and at a possibility of social network
emergence in Section 4.
Assertions, Beliefs, and Knowledge
We suppose that there is a discrete finite set F of N asser-
tions that is to be shared among all actors. We assume that
all assertions are equally important.
An assertion intrinsically can be true or false. We use ϕ
to denote the probability that a randomly selected assertion
from the set F is true. Note that ϕ is a system-wide param-
eter. The value of ϕ is higher for formal communities (e.g.,
a scientific community) and lower for informal communities
(e.g., a chatroom).
In addition to its intrinsic objective truthfulness, each
assertion known to an actor has a subjective belief associated
with it: the actor either believes that the assertion is true
or false, or fails to make a decision for herself. An assertion
that an actor does not know to be true or false is essentially
a rumor—a “story. . . without any known authority for [its]
truth” [11].
An actor Ai knows Fi ≤ N assertions, among which
Ai believes F
+
i assertions are true and F
−
i assertions are
false, and treats all other known assertions F ◦i as rumors
(obviously, F+i + F
◦
i + F
−
i = Fi). The probability of a
randomly chosen assertion Φ ∈ F (from the whole assertion
set for the network) being known by Ai is given by fi =
Fi/N . Similarly, we can find the probability of an assertion
believed as true, rumor, or false as f+i = F
+
i /Fi, f
◦
i =
F ◦i /Fi, and f
−
i = F
−
i /Fi, respectively.
Based on its own known set of assertions F i ⊆ F , actor
Ai forms its self-perceived knowledge Ki as follows:
Ki = F
+
i + F
−
i + λF
◦
i (1)
Here, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is a “rumor discount” coefficient to capture
the extent that an actor is willing to treat rumors as part
of her knowledge. An actor with λ = 0 completely discards
rumors from her self-perceived knowledge, whereas an actor
with λ = 1 treats all her known rumors as if they were
trustworthy assertions. Similar to Fi, knowledge Ki is also
bounded by N , and Fi ≤ Ki ≤ N . In this paper, we assume
that the value of λ is the same for all actors in a social
network. We further normalize an actor’s knowledge as ki =
Ki/N .
It is important to understand that the truthfulness of an
assertion is not necessarily in agreement with the actor’s be-
liefs. Good examples of the disagreement would be so-called
“urban myths” that are intrinsically false, but perceived as
true by many people.
Based on their perceived knowledge, we roughly clas-
sify all actors into “Ignoramuses” (low ki), “Mediocres”
(medium-ranged ki), and “Gurus” (high ki). No actor in
the network can definitely tell whether an assertion is true
or false. However, we assume that there exists an external
verification mechanism (an “oracle”) that knows the definite
answer.
Utility and Personality
A single communication between any two actors consists of
an exchange of at most two assertions (from Alice to Bob
and back) and optional feedback message(s). The commu-
nication intrinsically involves both actors considering their
self-perceived knowledge, reputation, and popularity, which
further determine their decisions of whether or not to for-
ward the assertions in the first place and whether or not to
provide feedback. An actor’s self-perceived knowledge, rep-
utation, and popularity collectively form her utility. The
weights an actor puts on these three utility components
characterize this actor’s personality. We will give a detailed
explanation of these concepts in this section.
We use a non-negative real number to measure an ac-
tor Ai’s reputation Ri—“overall quality or character as seen
or judged by people in general” [11]. Lower values of Ri
mean lower trustworthiness in Ai, suggesting that opinions
expressed by Ai—such as information and feedback—were
questionable in the past and should be considered with a
grain of salt. In the extreme case of Ri = 0, actor Ai’s be-
liefs are completely not credible. On the contrary, higher
values of Ri mean that Ai’s subjective evaluation of asser-
tions has been regarded as historically highly credible.
We measure an actor’s popularity Pi using another non-
negative real number. An actor’s popularity in a society is
somewhat synonymous to social visibility [8]: Pi = 0 cor-
responds to an actor who does not speak in public and in
general is not even known to exist. An actor with high pop-
ularity enjoys popular attention. We assume that there is
no correlation between Pi and Ri for the same actor Ai.
We suppose that an actor’s popularity decays by ∆P = −δ
per unit time unless the actor participates in information
exchange with other actors.
We further define normalized reputation and normalized
popularity as ri = Ri/N and pi = Pi/N . Note, in our study,
we choose N to be sufficiently large such that both ri and
pi are no larger than one.
We believe that the purpose of a rational actor is to
maximize her utility Ui, defined as a convex combination
of knowledge, reputation, and popularity with coefficients
0 ≤ κ, ρ, pi ≤ 1, κ+ ρ+ pi = 1:
Ui = κKi + ρRi + piPi. (2)
We use a particular set of coefficients {κ, ρ, pi} to charac-
terize a particular type of actors’ personality. For example,
κ = ρ = 0, pi = 1 describe a network of “Internet trolls”
(actors, for whom bloated popularity is the primary goal
of networking). On the other hand, κ = ρ = 0.5, pi = 0
probably corresponds to a scientific community of knowl-
edge seeking altruists who care about their reputation and
wisdom, but not about being quoted or even published.
In this paper, we focus on a homogeneous network where
all actors’ have the same utility function. We understand
that in a real social network, actors are heterogeneous. We
leave the heterogeneous network as future work.
Information Transmission between a Pair of Actors
During the passing of an assertion between two actors, both
actors update their self-perceived knowledge, reputation,
and popularity. This process involves evaluating knowledge,
learning assertions, sending feedback, and updating reputa-
tion and popularity. We now describe in this section the
basic steps that are performed in this process, but leave the
discussion on the actors’ the strategic decision making in the
next section.
We assume that initially each actor pre-learns a random
collection of assertions, which she randomly classifies as true
assertions, false assertions or rumors, and that a commu-
nication (including both sending assertions and feedback)
always takes a unit time.
Evaluating Knowledge
When an actor Ai has an assertion Φ ∈ F i to share with her
neighbor, she will decide whether to forward Φ to a neigh-
bor or hold it in order to maximize her utility, as defined
by Eq. (2). If Ai sends Φ to her neighbor Aj , then Aj may
choose to respond to Ai with either positive or negative feed-
back Ψ. Simultaneously, Aj has to make a similar decision
on whether to forward his assertion to Ai.
Upon receiving Φ from the Ai, the other actor Aj may
or may not be able to decide if Φ is true or false, based on
the following considerations:
• Aj ’s self-perceived knowledge.
• The probability of Φ being true by nature (an intrinsic
or objective characteristic but not a subjective belief
by any actor), given by the system-wide parameter ϕ.
• Ai’s reputation, Ri.
• Ai’s opinion on Φ: for an arbitrary assertion, the prob-
ability of that assertion being perceived by Ai as true
or false is given by f+i or f
−
i ; Ai has no definite opinion
on the assertion with the probability of f◦i .
Let g+ and g− be the probabilities of Aj deciding that
Φ is true or false respectively, and g◦ be the probability of
Aj failing to decide on Φ (i.e. declare it as a rumor). Note
that g+ + g− + g◦ = 1, because eventually Aj has to make
some decision. If both Ai and Aj have complete knowledge
of all assertions (i.e., ki = kj = 1), then we have:
g+ = f+i = f
+
j = ϕ,
g− = f−i = f
−
j = 1− ϕ,
g◦ = f◦i = f
◦
j = 0.
(3)
If Aj is an Ignoramus (kj = 0), we assume that Aj chooses
to trust Ai’s opinion f
∗
i (∗ ∈ {+,−, ◦}), discounted by her
reputation ri. That is,
g+ = rif
+
i ,
g− = rif
−
i ,
g◦ = 1− g+ − g−.
(4)
In all other cases where (0 < kj < 1), we assume that g
±
are weighted sums defined as:
g+ = kjϕ+ (1− kj) rif
+
i ,
g◦ = (1− kj) (rif
◦
i + (1− ri)) ,
g− = kj (1− ϕ) + (1− kj) rif
−
i ,
(5)
where Aj ’s knowledge kj is a weighting factor.
Note, in the above probability computation, we can guar-
antee that g+, g−, g◦ are no larger than 1 as ri is no larger
than 1 (as mentioned before, we choose N to be sufficiently
large).
Learning Assertions and Updating Knowledge and
Popularity
Once an assertion is transmitted from Ai to Aj (or back),
both actors’ knowledge and popularity may change due to
the transmission: Ai informs Aj of a potentially new as-
sertion Φ, and Aj corrects Ai’s opinion on Φ. When Aj
receives an assertion Φ, one of the following three scenarios
can happen:
1. Aj knows about Φ, and his new opinion on the asser-
tion, g∗, matches his existing opinion f∗j . In this case,
Aj is not interested in Φ. He discards the assertion and
does not improve Ai’s popularity. The probability of
this scenario is fj
(
g−f−j + g
+f+j + g
◦f◦j
)
.
2. Aj knows about Φ, but will reconsider his belief about
Φ. In this scenario, Aj re-labels Φ in the assertion set
F j and gives Ai a popularity increase of 1. Re-labeling
Φ does not change Fj , but it can change Kj (when Φ
becomes a rumor or ceases to be a rumor). The proba-
bility of this event is fj
(
1−
(
g−f−j + g
+f+j + g
◦f◦j
))
.
3. Finally, Φ can be completely new to Aj . Then Aj stores
Φ in the assertion set F j and gives Ai a popularity in-
crease of 1. The number of assertions of Aj ’s increases,
and the amount of knowledge of Aj ’s increases, too.
This scenario happens with probability 1− fj .
Then, we see that the overall knowledge change at Aj ’s side
is given by:
∆Kj =λ (1− fj)
+ (1− λ)
(
g− + g+ − fj
(
f+j + f
−
j
))
.
(6)
Notice that if Ai knows a priori that Aj is already in the
possession of the assertion that she is about to share with
him, then the probability of the above third scenario is 0,
and (6) changes accordingly:
∆K′j = (1− λ)
(
g− + g+ − fj
(
f+j + f
−
j
))
. (7)
This situation may arise when Ai has reinterpreted the as-
sertion. We will not use (7) in our further analysis.
Unlike Aj , Ai updates her knowledge based on the feed-
back provided by Aj (if any). The number of assertions at
her side does not change, only Ai’s opinion on them can
change, as well as Ai’s perceived knowledge that depends
on the opinion. If Ai trusts Aj (because of Aj ’s high rep-
utation Rj), then Ai can change her belief about Φ. The
change is given by the formula:
∆Ki = rj (1− λ)
(
g− + g+ −
(
f+i + f
−
i
))
. (8)
The total popularity premium to Ai is given by:
∆Pi = 1− fj
(
g+f+j + g
−f−j + g
◦f◦j
)
. (9)
Aj enjoys the popularity growth of 1 only if Aj chooses
to send feedback to Ai (i.e., by commenting her original
assertion).
Sending Feedback and Updating Reputation
A feedback mechanism is used by Aj to affect the reputation
of Ai and, eventually, Aj ’s own reputation.
We use an actor Ai’s reputation Ri as the measure of Ai’s
ability to inspire belief. Actor Ai’s successful prediction of
the true nature of an assertion should increase Ri, while
an incorrect prediction should decrease it. Unfortunately,
no actor in the network knows the true value of a random
assertion (even a Guru can predict that an assertion is true
only with the probability of ϕ). That is why we need an
external oracle that compares Aj ’s perception of assertion
Φ with the true nature of that assertion and concludes if the
evaluation was successful or not. If Aj is a Guru (high kj),
he makes the right choice and earns a reputation increase of
1. If Aj is an Ignoramus, the best he can do is to trust Ai
(to the extent of her reputation). In the latter case, Aj gets
a reputation boost of (1× ri) if Ai’s belief of Φ is accurate
(which happens with the probability of ϕf+i + (1 − ϕ)f
−
i ),
and a penalty of (−1× ri) otherwise (with the probability
of ϕf−i + (1 − ϕ)f
+
i ). After an assertion is passed between
the actors, the expected change of Aj ’s reputation is:
∆Rj = kj + (1− kj)
(
ri (2ϕ− 1)
(
f+i − f
−
i
))
. (10)
In the mean time, Aj can affect Ai’s reputation by pro-
viding feedback in the following way: if both actors agree
on their perceived nature of Φ (the true nature of Φ is not
involved) and Aj is a credible authority himself, then Ai’s
reputation improves by value 1; otherwise, it decreases by
value 1. In other words:
∆Ri = rj
( (
1− 2g+ − 2g−
) (
1− 2f+i − 2f
−
i
)
− 2
(
f+i g
+ + f−i g
−
) )
.
(11)
It is quite possible that the change of knowledge K, num-
bers of known, true, false, and neutral assertions F , F+, F−,
F ◦, popularity P or reputation R, resulting from a commu-
nication, will make one or more of these values greater than
N or less than 0. Our model is not designed to handle these
situations and should be used only when each of these num-
bers is greater than 1 and less than N − 1. This anomaly
can be avoided by choosing N to be large.
3 TWO-PLAYER INFORMATION DISSEMINA-
TION GAME
In the previous section, we gave a detailed analysis of the
basic steps involved in the information transmission between
two actors and described how the two actors update their
utilities (including self-perceived knowledge, reputation, and
popularity) depending on whether or not assertions and
feedback messages are transmitted. However, we have not
answered this question yet: under what circumstances are
the actors willing to transmit assertions and send feedback?
In this section, we will address this question under the as-
sumption that both actors know that each of them attempts
to maximize its own utility, and they are fully aware of the
impact on their own utilities from any combination of their
individual choices.
Such a strategic interaction between the actors can be
naturally modeled as a game with both actors being play-
ers. More specifically, both actors play a non-cooperative
non-zero-sum rectangular game. The utility change of both
players in the game are given by the payoff matrixMmn, 0 ≤
m,n ≤ 4, and depends on the strategies Smi and S
n
j selected
by the players. The rows of the matrix correspond to the
available actions of Ai, and the columns correspond to the
available actions of Aj . Each actor has to choose between
four actions:
S0: not to send an assertion and not to provide feedback,
S1: not to send an assertion but to provide feedback, if
possible,
S2: to send an assertion but not to provide feedback, and
S3: to send an assertion and to provide feedback, if possi-
ble.
The feedback can be sent only if an assertion has been
received. For this reason some elements in the matrix M
are identical:
1. M00 = M10 = M01 = M11 (if no assertion has been
transmitted, then no feedback can be sent), and, simi-
larly,
2. M02 =M03, M12 = M13, M20 =M30, M21 =M31.
We use {S∗i , S
∗
j } to denote the Nash equilibrium strat-
egy profile of the game. At each such equilibrium, we can
find each actor’s state variables such as their utilities, and
normalized values of popularity, reputation, and knowledge.
In general, despite a very special structure of M , the equi-
librium in this game corresponds to a mixed strategy.
4 CASE STUDY: INFORMATION DISSEMINA-
TION IN NETWORK
In [13], we explored the information dissemination process in
a network with a large number of actors, based on the one-
way two-player game model (of two interacting actors, only
one was allowed to send an assumption, and the other could
send feedback). We conducted a number of experiments by
simulating the information dissemination in discrete time
steps on a complete bidirectional social network of 1000 ac-
tors. At each time step, one actor Ai was randomly chosen
to play the game with another randomly chosen actor Aj .
The state values of both actors at Nash equilibrium for each
game were recorded.
The model parameters of the simulations were selected
based on the authors’ common sense and were as follows.
The probability of an assertion being true was ϕ = 0.8.
The actor popularity decay factor was δ = 0.1. The rumor
discount coefficient was λ = 0.5. The maximum number of
assertions in the network was N = 2000.
In each experiment, the network was populated by actors
of a certain type. In the first experiment, all actors were
“Internet trolls”: κ = 0.1, ρ = 0.1, pi = 0.8; in the second
experiment, we modeled an “Internet expert” community:
κ = 0.2, ρ = 0.7, pi = 0.1. In each experiment, a third
of the actors initially started as “Ignoramuses” (k = 0.1),
another third as “Mediocres” (k = 0.5), and the remaining
third as “Gurus” (k = 0.9). The initial values of reputation
r, popularity p, and the fractions of true and false assertions
f+, f− were drawn uniformly at random between the mini-
mum value of 0 and the maximum values of 0.5 for f− and
1 for the other three parameters.
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Figure 1: Distribution of actors (z axis) by k as a function
of simulation time (one-way communications). Top: “troll”
community; bottom: “expert” community.
For the duration of 10 million assertion transmissions
(on average 10,000 communications per actor), we moni-
tored the distribution of k in the network as a function of
the simulation time (the simulation time is defined as the
average number of communications per actor). The results
of sample simulation runs are shown in Figure 1. The most
characteristic features of the graphs are the difference in
learning speed between “trolls” (above) and “experts” (be-
low) and the bifurcations in the “expert” community, where
actors with higher reputation learn much slower than those
with lower reputation.
To understand the difference between one-way and two-
way full-duplex communication models, we reproduced the
original experiment based on the four-strategy game model
built in the previous section (Fig. 2).
One can tell from Figs. 1 and 2 that both models con-
verge to stable states; however, the convergence speed and
behavior are not the same. The “troll” communities con-
verge to the state of “total knowledge,” where all actors
become fully knowledgeable (f ≈ k ≈ 1), after a finite num-
ber of iterations. The “full-duplex” community converges
about twice as fast as the “one-way” community because of
the expanded capacity of the communication channels.
The distribution of information in the “expert” com-
munities disperses slower in time then in the “troll” com-
munities, but again faster when simulated using the two-
way model. Most importantly, there is no more bifurca-
tion for “Ignoramuses” and “Gurus” caused by the varia-
tion in their reputation. On the contrary, the low-reputation
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Figure 2: Distribution of actors (z axis) by k as a function of
simulation time (full-duplex communications). Top: “troll”
community; bottom: “expert” community.
“Mediocres” soon become indistinguishable from “Gurus,”
and high-reputation “Mediocres” join the ranks of the for-
mer “Ignoramuses.”
5 CASE STUDY: EMERGENCE OF A SOCIAL
NETWORK
In another case study, we explored the possibility of emer-
gence of social networks as the result of local optimization
of the network members’ utilities.
Our assumption is that a member Ai of a social net-
work A engages in information exchange with her neighbors
(“friends”). Ai keeps the “friendship” relationship with Aj if
a communication with Aj increases Ai’s utility. Otherwise,
the relationship is severed after some time. We propose that
the network built according to these principles is a “small-
world” network (all major massive online social networks
belong to this class).
To validate the hypothesis, we created a collection of
10,000 “expert” members. Then, for each member, we cre-
ated 25 random “friendship” connections per member. We
simulated five two-way interactions along each connection
and accumulated the overall utility change for each connec-
tion. At the end, we discarded all connections with a neg-
ative utility. This process was repeated several times, but
only the first iteration made a significant change to the net-
work: the degree distribution in the range from 5 to 24 after
the first iteration was close to Pareto distribution with the
coefficient of −1.86, which is typical for a major real social
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Figure 3: Distribution of node degree in an emerging social
network.
network (Fig. 3). Since Pareto distribution of node degrees
is a common attribute of a small-world network, we treat
this result as an implicit proof of our hypothesis.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we extended a previously developed game theo-
retical model of information dissemination. The model takes
into account both personal traits of actors (the desire for
self-perceived knowledge, reputation, and popularity) and
the properties of the disseminated information (in partic-
ular, its overall truthfulness). The feedback mechanism is
used to control the reputation of information senders and
deter them from distributing unconfirmed rumors.
The model is mathematically represented by a two-player
non-zero sum, non-cooperative game, where the available
actions are to forward an assertion or hold it indefinitely
and to provide feedback on received assertions or not.
Our numerical experiments show that a massive social
network of actors communicating using the proposed model
demonstrates intuitively acceptable aggregate learning be-
havior, and that it is possible to explain an emergence of a
“small-world” network by allowing its members to discard
negative-utility connections.
To improve and generalize our model, we propose the
following future research directions.
• The variability of κ, ρ, and pi for different actors in a
network will be considered.
• A multicast scenario (when an actor atomically trans-
mits an assertion to a group of recipients) will be ana-
lyzed.
• A connection between P , R, and K and selected char-
acteristics of real massive online social networks will be
explored.
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